Signcryption is a cryptographic primitive that performs signature and encryption simultaneously, at lower computational costs and communication overheads than the signature-then-encryption approach. In this paper, we propose an efficient multi-recipient signcryption scheme based on the bilinear pairings, which broadcasts a message to multiple users in a secure and authenticated manner. We prove its semantic security and unforgeability under the Gap Diffie-Hellman problem assumption in the random oracle model. The proposed scheme is more efficient than re-signcrypting a message n times using a signcryption scheme in terms of computational costs and communication overheads. Key words: signcryption; multi-recipient signcryption; bilinear pairings; provable security CLC number: TP 309 
Introduction
Confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation and authentication are the important requirements for many cryptographic applications. A traditional approach to achieve these requirements is to sign-then-encrypt the message. Signcryption, first proposed by Zheng [1] in 1997, is a cryptographic primitive that performs signature and encryption simultaneously, at lower computational costs and communication overheads than the signature-then-encryption approach. Zheng's scheme [1] was proven secure by Baek et al [2] who described a formal security model in a multi-user setting. The bilinear pairings, namely the Weil pairing and the Tate pairing of algebraic curves, are important tools for construction of identity-based cryptographic schemes. Many identity-based signcryption schemes [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] and certificate-based signcryption schemes [8, 9] using the bilinear pairings have been proposed. However, all of these schemes consist of only single recipient. In practice, broadcasting a message to multiple users in a secure and authenticated manner is an important facility for a group of people who are jointly working on the same project to communicate with one another. Zheng [10] proposed a signcryption scheme for multiple recipients based on the discrete logarithm problem. However, Zheng's scheme [10] is inefficient since it is sequential composition of signcryption. In addition, the formal model and security proof for his scheme is also not considered.
The main contribution of this paper is to present a formal security model for multi-recipient signcryption and propose an efficient multi-recipient signcryption scheme using the bilinear pairings. We then prove its security in the random oracle model assuming the Gap Diffie-Hellman problem is computationally hard.
The Formal Model

Generic Scheme
A generic multi-recipient signcryption scheme consists of the following three algorithms.
Keygen: Given a security parameter k, it generates a private/public key pair (sk, pk).
Signcrypt A's advantage is defined to be Adv ind-cca2 (A):
Definition 2 (Unforgeability) A multi-recipient signcryption scheme is existentially unforgeable against chosen message attack (MRSC-EUF-CMA) if no polynomially bounded adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the following game:
① The challenger runs keygen to generate a key pair (sk , pk ). sk
S S
S is kept secret while pk S is given to forger F.
② The forger F makes a number of queries to the signcryption oracle as in the confidentiality game. Again, these queries can also be produced adaptively. Note that we allow F to have access to all recipients' private keys as well as the corresponding public keys. ③ At the end of the game, F produces a ciphertext σ and wins the game if the result of unsigncrypt
is not the ⊥ symbol such that σ was not the output of a signcryption query Signcrypt 1 ( ,sk , pk , , pk ) n S R R m made during the game. Note that we do not require the unsigncryption query since the adversary can simulate the unsigncryption oracle by himself.
The Proposed Scheme
We assume that both the sender and the recipients agree on public parameters: security parameters k and l, cyclic groups G 1 and G 2 of prime order q≥2 k such that l is the number of bits required to represent elements of G 1 , a generator P of G 1 and a bilinear map Keygen: User u chooses his private key x u from Z q randomly and sets corresponding public key Y u =x u P. We will denote the sender and the recipients respectively by u=S and u=R i (i=1,…,n) and their key pair by ( , )
S S x Y and ( , )
To signcrypt a message m M ∈ for recipients R 1 , …, R n , the sender S follows the steps below.
① Choose r∈Z q and R∈G 1 randomly, respectively. ② Compute U=rP. 
is then returned as the signcryption of m.
• Unsigncryption queries: For a unsigncryption query on a ciphertext (U,c,V,Z 1 ,…,Z n ) and a sender's public key Y S both chosen by A, B proceeds as follows: it scans the list L 3 , looking for tuples It is easy to show that A will not realize that σ is not a valid signcryption for the sender's private key S x and the public key Y u unless it asks for the hash value H 3 (aP,bP,abP). In that case, the solution of the Diffie-Hellman problem would be inserted in L 3 exactly at that moment and it does not matter if the simulation of A's view is no longer perfect.
At the end of the game, A produces a result which is ignored by B. The latter just looks into the list L 3 for tu- We can now assess B's probability of success. Let AskH 3 be the event that A asks the hash value of abP during the simulation. As long as the simulation of the attack's environment is perfect, the probability for AskH 3 to happen is the same as in a real attack. In a real attack, 
Efficiency
We compare the major computational costs and communication overheads of our scheme with those of the obvious construction of multi-recipient signcryption that simply re-signcrypts a message n times using Yang et al's signcryption scheme [8] (RSY) in Table 1 . It is obvious that our scheme is more efficient than re-signcrypting a message n times using Yang et al's scheme. 
Conclusion
We have proposed a multi-recipient signcryption scheme that broadcasts a message to multiple users in a secure and authenticated manner. Our scheme is proved to be secure in the random oracle model assuming the Gap Diffie-Hellman problem is computationally hard. Our scheme has much less computational costs and communication overheads than re-signcrypting a message n times using a signcryption scheme.
